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Message Text

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S E C R E T STATE 127307

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR VERIFICATION

REF: STATE 071208

1. BECAUSE RECENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR DISCUSSION OF MBFR VER-
IFICATION IN THE SPC HAVE ADDRESSED INDIVIDUAL POINTS IN
PIECEMEAL FASHION, WE FELT THAT ADDRESSEES MIGHT FIND USE-
FUL A MORE COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF CURRENT WASHINGTON
STAFF LEVEL THINKING ON THE SUBJECT. THE FOLLOWING IS
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STRICTLY FOR ADDRESSEES' BACKGROUND AND NOT FOR ANY OTHER
USE, EXCEPT FOR PARAS 4-5 PELOW WHICH USNATO AND EMBASSY
BONN MAY WISH TO DRAW UPON. WE WOULD WELCOME COMMENTS FROM
ALL ADDRESSEES AS THE SUBJECT DEVELOPS FURTHER.

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2. SHARING OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. UNDERSTANDABLY, IN ALLIED DISCUSSION THERE HAS BEEN A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONFUSION BETWEEN SHARING THE PRODUCTS OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND THE EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES-FOR MBFR VERIFICATION. FOR SOME OF THE ALLIES, MBFR VERIFICATION HAS BEEN ONE MORE OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO GET AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE WHICH HAS BEEN EXTREMELY CLOSELY HELD BECAUSE OF SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS.

3. WE HAVE, OBVIOUSLY, NOT WISHED TO ENCOURAGE DISCUSSION OF SHARING PRODUCTS OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS IN NATO FORUMS, AND WE SHALL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE MULTILATERAL DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT. FYI. WE ARE ENGAGING FRG IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS IN DOD/MOD CHANNELS TO SEE IF WE CAN SATISFY FRG AS TO OUR CAPABILITIES. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED. YOU SHOULD NOT MENTION THIS YET TO FRG REPS OR TO OTHER ALLIES. END FYI.

4. EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL MEANS. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES IN VERIFICATION THE JUDGEMENTS IN ANNEX E OF OUR APRIL 30, 1973, SUBMISSIONS TO NATO REPRESENTED OUR BEST NATIONAL JUDGEMENTS BASED ON AN APPRECIATION OF ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE US. THEY PROVIDED BASIC JUDGEMENTS AS TO HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE TO LEARN OF DIFFERENT MAGNITUDES OF CHANGES IN THE EASTERN FORCES AND OF THE RELATIVE DIFFICULTIES OF VERIFYING DIFFERENT KINDS OF REDUCTIONS.

5. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE VIEWS WE EXPRESSED IN THE APRIL 30 PAPER REMAIN VALID. MOREOVER, ALLIED INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE IMS SHOULD BY VIRTUE OF THEIR OWN EXPERIENCE BE SUFFICIENTLY AWARE OF THE FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE THROUGH THE SITCEN AND NATO-WIDE SYSTEM AND THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE IN VARIOUS NATO ESITMATES AND HANDBOOKS TO BE ABLE TO APPRECIATE THE VALIDITY OF THE BASIC JUDGEMENTS AND TENDENCIES DESCRIBED IN THE APRIL

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30 PAPER.

6. NATO POSITION PAPER (CM(73)83). TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE JUDGEMENTS IN OUR TECHNICAL STUDIES, THE US CONCLUDED THAT AS A MATTER OF POLICY IT WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO MAKE NEGOTIATED INSPECTION A PRECONDITION FOR AN MBFR AGREEMENT. THIS POLICY JUDGEMENT BY IMPLICATION INCLUDED A CALCULATED RISK ABOUT THE KINDS OF UNCERTAINTIES DESCRIBED IN THE APRIL 30 PAPER.

7. AT THE SAME TIME, THE US DID TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF MANY ALLIES -- THE GERMANS AMONG THEM -- WHO VERY MUCH WANTED TO TRY TO GET THE EAST TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATED

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INSPECTION. THE RESULT WAS AGREEMENT IN THE BASIC NATO INSTRUCTION TO THE AD HOC GROUP IN VIENNA (CM(73)83) TO THIS PASSAGE: "ANY MBFR AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, INCLUDING NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE MODALITIES AND EXTENT OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING INSPECTION, SHOULD DEPEND ON THE CONTENT AND NATURE OF THE AGREEMENTS REACHED. NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS. ANY MBFR AGREEMENT SHOULD BE VERIFIABLE WITHOUT ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATED PRO-VISIONS FOR MULTILATERAL VERIFICATION. IT IS NEVERTHELESS DESIRABLE TO SEEK MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION PROVISIONS".

8. THE US HAD ALREADY PUT THE ALLIES ON NOTICE IN THE APRIL 30 PAPER AND AGAIN IN AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S STATEMENT OF JULY 27 THAT IT WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO SET EASTERN AGREEMENT TO INSPECTION AS A PRECONDITION FOR AN AGREEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE RECOGNIZE THAT IN AGREEING TO CM(73)83) WE WERE UNDERTAKING TO MAKE AN EFFORT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO GET THE EAST TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATED INSPECTION AND WE BELIEVE SUCH AN EFFORT IS WORTHWHILE. HOWEVER, WE WANT TO BE SURE THAT WHAT WE ARE SEEKING TO OBTAIN IS A USEFUL SYSTEM OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION, RATHER THAN CUMBERSOME AND POSSIBLY POLITICALLY ABRASIVE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD PRODUCE LITTLE ADDITIONAL ASSURANCE THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS BEING OBSERVED. MOREOVER, WE RECOGNIZE THAT FIRST PHASE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS ARE LIKELY TO INFLUENCE
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VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SECOND PHASE.

9. WE ALSO BELIEVE NEGOTIATED INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS ARE DESIRABLE NOT ONLY TO SUPPLEMENT NTMS (WHICH HAVE THEIR LIMITATIONS) IN ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH AN MBFR AGREEMENT, BUT IN AUTHENTICATING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS AS WELL. ALTHOUGH LESS IMPORTANT, THE PRECEDENT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING, AS NOTED ABOVE, FOR MBFR PHASE II.

GERMAN VIEWS

10. OBVIOUSLY, NO MBFR ARRANGEMENT WHICH IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE GERMANS CAN BE DESIRABLE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW SINCE INTER ALIA ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT MBFR OBJECTIVES IS TO MAINTAIN ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY. IT IS ALSO QUITE CLEAR THAT SOME OF THE CONCERNS CITED BY ROTH AND RUTH AND BY GERMAN REPRESENTATIVES IN BRUSSELS TOUCH UPON ISSUES OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO BONN. IT IS FAR FROM SELF-EVIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT ANY OF THE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS UNDER DISCUSSION WOULD IN FACT HAVE SUCH DIRE IMPLICATIONS AS THE GERMANS HAVE

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SUGGESTED. IN FACT, THEY WOULD NOT APPLY EXCLUSIVELY TO GERMAN TERRITORY, BUT WOULD BE APPLIED TO WIDER AREAS IN BOTH EAST AND WEST. MOREOVER, THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE ROOM FOR ARGUMENT AS TO WHETHER OBLIGATIONS FREELY UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH A MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT WOULD CONSTITUTE AN ENHANCEMENT OR A DIMINUTION OF GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY OR WHETHER SUCH OBLIGATIONS MARKED A STEP AWAY FROM POSTWAR RESTRICTIONS RATHER THAN A RETURN TO THEM.

11. MOBILE INSPECTION VS. FIXED POSTS

WE ARE CURRENTLY STUDYING THE QUESTION OF FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS AT DESIGNATED ENTRY AND EXIT POINTS AND EXPECT TO FORWARD COMMENTS SHORTLY. ONE PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION HAS ALREADY BEEN ANTICIPATED. WASHINGTON EXPERTS PRELIMINARILY AGREE THAT MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS, ESPECIALLY WITH ACCESS TO KEY POINTS, PROMISE MORE USEFUL INTELLIGENCE THAN A FIXED POST SYSTEM.
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THIS SEEMS TO BE PARTICULARLY TRUE IF ONE ASSUMES THAT ONLY A SMALL INSPECTORATE IS LIKELY TO BE NEGOTIABLE IN PHASE I CONTEXT. NEVERTHELESS, WE DO NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT FIXED INSPECTION POSTS AT ENTRY AND EXIT POINTS MIGHT BE A HELPFUL SUPPLEMENT TO NTM.

12. TO THE EXTENT THAT SOME OF THE GERMAN ARGUMENTATION IS IN TERMS OF THE PRINCIPLE--NOT THE MODALITIES-- OF FOREIGN PRESENCE, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHY FIXED POSTS, SOME OF WHICH WOULD BE IN INTERIOR LOCATIONS, ARE ACCEPTABLE AND MOBILE INSPECTION IS NOT. BOTH COULD INVOLVE PERMANENT PACT PRECENCE IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE NGA.

INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE

13. WE HAVE NOT STUDIED THE DETAILS OF A SYSTEM OF INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE IN THE EVENT OF A SUSPECTED VIOLATION. BUT SOME THINGS ARE READILY APPARENT. SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD NOT BE DESIGNED TO PRODUCE A REGULAR FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE. AS A MEANS OF COPING WITH A POSSIBLE VIOLATION IT WOULD BE CUMBERSOME.

14. AN INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE SYSTEM COULD INVOLVE A QUOTA SYSTEM AND CONSEQUENTLY ONE WOULD HAVE TO DEVELOP A STRATEGY FOR WHEN TO USE CHALLENGES. ADOPTION OF A HIGH THRESHOLD MIGHT LEAVE THE OTHER SIDE TOO MUCH FREEDOM OF ACTION. A LOW THRESHOLD MIGHT EXHAUST THE QUOTA AND LEAVE ONE WITHOUT RECOURSE FOR SOME PERIOD OF TIME.

15. IN ANY CASE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN INSPECTION WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE DELAYED BY A MATTER OF

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DAYS, OR WEEKS, AS THE ALLIES DISCUSS THE NEED FOR A
CHALLENGE, AND THE EAST DELAYS ITS RESPONSE TO A
WESTERN REQUEST FOR AN INSPECTION VISIT. OUR COMMENTS
IN REF A ALSO APPLY.

. ER AL INSPECTION. IN GENERAL AN EFFECTIVE
S STE - LOW LEVEL AERIAL OBSERVATION COULD BE A
MORE INTRUSIVE FORM OF INSPECTION THAN GROUND
OBSERVATION, AND EASTERN RESISTANCE IS LIKELY TO BE
GREATER. IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR WHETHER OR HOW
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SUBSTITUTING AERIAL OBSERVATION FOR GROUND INSPECTION
WOULD MEET GERMAN CONCERNS. IF THE ACCEPTABILITY
OF AERIAL INSPECTION TO BONN DEPENDS UPON IMPOSING
RESTRICTIVE CONDITIONS SUCH AS HOST COUNTRY CONTROL OVER
WHEN MISSIONS COULD BE FLOWN OR REQUIREMENTS TO USE
HOST-COUNTRY AIRCRAFT AND CREWS, (AS THE GERMAN
RESERVATIONS ON THE WORKING GROUP REPORT ON AERIAL
INSPECTION-USNATO 2563-IMPLY) THEN THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF AERIAL OBSERVATION WOULD BE SEVERELY DEGRADED.

17. PROSPECTS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT WE WILL HAVE TO
MAKE COMPROMISES WITH BONN'S VIEW TO ACHIEVE AN
AGREED ALLIED POSITION ON VERIFICATION.

18. IN VIENNA, THERE WOULD BE TACTICAL ADVANTAGE
IN DEVELOPING THE ALLIED VERIFICATION POSITION IN
A LITTLE MORE DETAIL, BUT THAT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE
URGENT. IN ANY CASE, WE ARE STILL FAR FROM A FINAL
AGREEMENT AND DEFINITIVE ALLIED SCHEMES FOR VERIFICATION
ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE NEEDED FOR SOME TIME.

19. IN BRUSSELS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE US SHOULD KEEP
A LOW PROFILE IN THE DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION.
WE WANT TO AVOID HAVING VERIFICATION COME TO BE SEEN
AS A SUBJECT OF DISPUTE BETWEEN THE US AND FRG. IN THE
MEANTIME WE WOULD LIKE TO GET A CLEAR SENSE OF HOW
THE OTHER ALLIES SEE THE GERMAN POSITION. AS WE
CONSIDER POSSIBLE WAYS TO ACCOMMODATE THE GERMANS,
WE WILL WANT TO KNOW WHETHER ONE OR ANOTHER MOVE
WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER ALLIES. SISCO

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